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Abstract
We examine motivations for prosocial behavior using new data on volun-
teer ¯re¯ghters that contain a dictator-game based measure of altruism,
surveyed measures of other behavioral factors, and call records that pro-
vide an objective measure of time spent volunteering. Controlling for a
variety of other explanations, we ¯nd that the decision to volunteer is
positively correlated with altruism as well as with concern for social rep-
utation or \image." Moreover, by utilizing variation in the presence and
level of small stipends paid to the ¯re¯ghters, we ¯nd that the positive
e®ect of monetary incentives declines with image concerns, supporting a
prediction that extrinsic incentives can crowd out image motivation for
prosocial behavior.
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The prominent role of volunteering in the charitable provision of goods and ser-
vices has helped to motivate a variety of theoretical models of prosocial behavior
over the past twenty years. Explanations of why people supply labor seemingly
for free have jointly and alternately considered volunteering as a consumption
good, as a way of ensuring the provision of a public good, as a means of in-
vesting in human capital, as a means of gaining other extrinsic rewards, and as
a manifestation of underlying tastes and attributes such as extroversion, altru-
ism, or a desire to look \good" to others (e.g., Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987;
Andreoni, 1989; Duncan, 1999; Clary and Snyder, 1999; Ziemek, 2006; B¶ enabou
and Tirole, 2006). However, a lack of appropriate data has left us with a more
sparse empirical literature and an incomplete understanding of the extent to
which these various possibilities drive volunteerism in practice. Survey-based
evidence suggests that wages and income are related to volunteer labor supply
(Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Freeman, 1997). However, Freeman (1997) ¯nds
that a larger determinant of volunteering is simply being asked and concludes
more attention should be paid to tastes for prosocial activities, of which there
are few measures in existing surveys.
We introduce data from a sample of volunteer ¯re¯ghters and non-volunteer
community members to provide evidence on possible taste-based motivations
for volunteering as well as a link between an experimental measure of altruism
and a real-world outcome. The data are a combination of information from a
survey, a ¯eld experiment, and ¯re department records. The survey provides
the usual demographic and income controls as well as measures from personality
inventories of traits such as extroversion and risk aversion. We deviate from
using only survey measures of personality traits because, along with problems
associated with the hypothetical nature of some survey questions, self reports
1may be especially susceptible to what Carpenter (2002) terms idealized persona
bias in which a respondent projects the person that he would like to be. We
therefore use an experimental measure of altruism via a representative version
of the dictator game in which there are real material costs associated with
revealing prosocial preferences.1 And, rather than relying on self-reports of
volunteer labor supply, we utilize call records from ¯re departments that record
which members \turned out" for calls over the course of a calendar year.
We ¯nd that altruism is a key motivator in choosing to join the volunteer
¯re service, which supports the external validity of our version of the dictator
game in predicting real-life behavior. However, conditional on selection, altru-
ism plays a role in training hours but not in call response. In contrast to the
results for altruism, image concerns, as proxied by having a vanity license plate,
are associated with the decision to volunteer and with the visible activity of call
response, but not with the less visible activity of training, supporting predic-
tions that the e®ect of image concerns increases with the visibility of the activity
(Nelson and Greene, 2003; B¶ enabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009). Moreover, we ¯nd that paying small stipends to the volunteers increases
turnout for some, but that the e®ect is dampened for those who have greater
image concerns. These results con¯rm recent theoretical predictions that pro-
viding extrinsic motivations to volunteers can have unintended negative e®ects
by crowding out image motivations to volunteer (B¶ enabou and Tirole, 2006).
Although it is not our primary focus, we also present evidence on motivations
such as being invited, volunteering to make friends or bene¯t one's career, and
religion. Overall, these factors appear to play a positive role in the decision to
become a volunteer, but to have a small or even negative relationship with the
amount of time spent volunteering.
1Experiments are \representative" if the decision problem re°ects some aspect of the par-
ticipant's environment. (See Carpenter et al. (2008) for a discussion.)
2We proceed with an overview of theories of prosocial behavior such as vol-
unteering and with a model that incorporates altruism, image concerns, and
material rewards into the decision to volunteer. Section 3 then provides a de-
scription of the data. In Sections 4 and 5 we examine selection into the ¯re
service and the call turn out of volunteer ¯re¯ghters. We o®er concluding re-
marks in Section 6.
2 A model of \turning out"
Papers in the public ¯nance and labor literatures have traditionally treated
prosocial behavior such as volunteering as generating some combination of a
public good, consumption good, or investment good (e.g., Menchik and Weis-
brod, 1987; Brown and Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999). Others have focused
more on the role of \pure" and \warm-glow" altruism in motivating volunteers
(e.g., Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989, 1990, 2006; B¶ enabou and Tirole, 2006). The
di®erences in terminology{ which serve to emphasize the nature of the activity
versus the nature of the volunteer{ mask what are essentially similar approaches.
Whether volunteering is thought of as a public good or as the product of pure
altruism, the individual cares only that some level of the good is provided and
not who is responsible for the provision; hence, government spending on the
public good will \crowd out" private donations of time or money. If volunteer-
ing is instead a consumption good or the product of \impure" or \warm-glow"
altruism, (Andreoni, 1990) the act of giving itself generates utility for the vol-
unteer, and government provision will not compete to the same extent with
private provision. The available empirical evidence suggests that volunteers
care both about the level of provision of their product as well as about the act
of giving. Government spending appears to at least partially crowd out vol-
unteering (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Brown and Lankford, 1992; Duncan,
31999; Ziemek, 2006) and in the lab people behave in a manner consistent with
a mixture of \pure" and \warm-glow" altruism (Andreoni, 1993; Andreoni and
Miller, 1993; Forsythe et al., 1994; Elizabeth Ho®man and Smith, 1994; Palfrey
and Prisbrey, 1997; Goeree et al., 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002). A third
possibility is that there are other extrinsic motivations for volunteering beyond
utility gained from the public good created or by the act of giving. One example
is investment models in which volunteering is a means of obtaining human cap-
ital that will yield returns in the labor market (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987;
Ziemek, 2006).
Like Ariely et al. (2009) we borrow from the model of prosocial behavior de-
veloped by B¶ enabou and Tirole (2006) (BT), which emphasizes the relationship
between (pure or impure) altruism, extrinsic motivations, and image concerns.
Our model is slightly simpler in that we focus attention on one's interest in
maintaining a reputation for prosociality and ignore any other image concerns.
While simpler, our version is still su±cient to motivate the issues on which we
collect data.
Agents in the model are motivated by three factors: altruistic preferences,
extrinsic monetary incentives, and image concerns. Agents with altruistic pref-
erences for the social good place a value, va on prosocial activities, a, like joining
the local ¯re department or \turning out" for individual calls. Agents may re-
ceive monetary compensation, y, for their prosocial acts (e.g., some ¯re¯ghters
receive modest hourly wages for their e®orts) which they value at vyy. Lastly,
some agents care about their reputation or image in the community according to
R(a;y). Combining these three sources of motivation with the cost of engaging
in prosocial acts, C(a), we have:
U(a) = (va + vyy)a + R(a;y) ¡ C(a): (1)
4The ¯rst and last terms in (1) are straightforward especially because we set
C(a) = ka
2
2 ; however, the image concerns require further elucidation. We as-
sume that an agent's preference type, (va;vy), is determined by an independent
draw from a bivariate normal distribution and de¯ne one's image concern as
follows:
R(a;y) = xI¨(z)E(vaja;y) (2)
where x determines the extent to which an altruistic act will be visible and
I¨ : z ! f0;1g is an indicator function publicly identifying those agents who are
motivated by image, E(vaja;y), or the beliefs of others about the agent's value
on prosocial activities. In other words, agents with image concerns comprise a
subset ¨ of the population.
Substituting (2) and ka
2
2 into (1) and di®erentiating yields the ¯rst order
conditions for the optimal level of prosocial behavior which depend on whether
or not image concerns matter.
ak =
½
va + vyy if z = 2 ¨
va + vyy + x
@E(vaja;y)
@a if z 2 ¨
¾
(3)
For those unconcerned with image the optimal level of prosociality is easy to
determine: a¤ = (va + vyy)=k.
Solving the ¯rst order condition for those agents valuing image is harder than
it ¯rst appears because it is not simply a matter of evaluating the expectation,
E(vaja;y), and substituting in its derivative. At the heart of the model is a
signal extraction problem in which on-lookers need to evaluate the altruistic
intentions of the agent (va) using the entire decision problem. In other words
on-lookers need to anticipate how agents will respond to incentives when they
evaluate their actions.
5To see the subtle nature of the problem, we (following BT) exploit the fact
that an agent's choice of a reveals a clue about his intentions. The clue, from
(3), is that va + vyy is equal to ak ¡ x
@E(vaja;y)
@a at the optimum. This means
that although one can not determine va directly from one's choice of a, one
can make inferences about va based on va + vyy because va and vy are jointly
distributed and y is exogenously determined.












after considerable calculation2, one can derive




(va + vyy ¡ ¹ va ¡ ¹ vyy)
and after substituting from the ¯rst order condition (3) we get
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Now notice that if we take the derivative of (4) with respect to a we get
@E(vaja;y)
@a







. With some rearranging, (5) takes the form of a linear
di®erential equation that has the general solution
@E(vaja;y)
@a
= ½k + »e
¡a
½x
in which » is a constant of integration. Lastly, as in BT, because the agent's
objective function is well behaved only if » = 0, an interior solution occurs where
@E(vaja;y)
@a = ½k and the ¯rst order condition for agents with image concerns
becomes


















(x2 ¡ ¹2); (1 ¡ %2)¾2
1
¶
where % is the correlation coe±cient,
¾12
¾1¾2 .
6ak = va + vyy + x½k:
The last thing to do is to evaluate ½ and substitute. This results in the
following prediction about the extent to which agents will engage in prosocial
behavior.
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium in which prosocial acts depend
on one's type, the material incentive and whether or not one is concerned with
image. Those not concerned with image contribute at the level a¤ =
(va+vyy)
k









Regardless of one's concern for image, altruistic preferences, va, increase
one's supply of prosocial behavior. The net e®ect of the material incentive
y, however, is only unambiguously positive for acts that are not visible or for
those agents who do not worry about their image. Using Proposition 1 we can
generate three comparative static predictions which will form the basis of our
empirical examination of the behavior of volunteer ¯re¯ghters.
Corollary 2 Agents with higher altruistic valuations supply more prosocial be-
havior.
Corollary 3 Agents who do not care about image supply more prosocial behav-
ior when the material incentive increases.
Corollary 4 For agents who care about image and ¾ay = 0, an increase in ma-
terial incentives crowds out the image motivation for prosocial behavior. The net
e®ect of material incentives on the provision of prosocial behavior is ambiguous.
Clearly, the derivative @a¤=@va is positive indicating that we should expect
an unequivocal relationship between one's altruistic preference and volunteer
behavior. Likewise, for those people who do not worry about their image, the
7e®ect of an increase in the material incentive, @a¤=@yjz= 2¨, should also be pos-
itive. However, once one's image enters into the calculations, the e®ect of ma-
terial incentives on prosocial behavior becomes less clear.3 If we are willing
to consider the BT baseline case of ¾ay = 0, then the derivative of interest,
@a¤=@yjz2¨, indicates at least partial crowding out of image incentives because
the derivative of the image part of a¤ is negative. That is, providing material
incentives for prosocial behavior can crowd out image motivations to perform
good deeds. What is unknown is whether the direct positive e®ect of material
incentives is outweighed by the indirect negative e®ect on image. In the case of
our volunteer ¯re¯ghters, we will see that the two e®ects are of roughly equal
magnitude so that the net e®ect of material incentives is zero for volunteers with
image concerns.
3 An overview of the data
Vermont is comprised mostly of rural areas that rely on volunteer ¯re ¯re¯ghters
to respond to emergencies such as hazardous material spills, vehicle accidents,
carbon monoxide alarms, and, of course, ¯res. Of the 237 ¯re departments in
the state, only 10 are made of up of full-time paid professional ¯re¯ghters while
the remainder rely on volunteers.
In February of 2006 we sent an initial survey to ¯re chiefs in the state that re-
quested information on the number of ¯re¯ghters at their department, any com-
pensation paid, annual calls, and training requirements. One hundred twenty
nine surveys were returned, yielding a 55 percent response rate.4 Based on these
3The e®ect of material incenstives is only unclear if the prosocial behavior is visible. If
prosocial acts are not publicly visible (i.e., x = 0) then they do not a®ect image and there is
no image crowd-out of material incentives.
4We observed no correlation between the size or locations of the towns associated with
departments and response rates. We do not know of other data on Vermont ¯re departments
that would allow further exploration of the determinants of response and assume that response
is, in fact, not random. However, observations from the initial department surveys do not form
the basis for analysis in the paper.
8surveys, the time commitment for volunteer ¯re¯ghters is substantial. Half of
departments require that volunteers complete \Fire¯ghter I" training, which
requires 144 hours of class time over seven months, before being admitted as
a full member. Fire¯ghters who drive department vehicles or seek additional
certi¯cation in ¯re ¯ghting, tactical rescue, and other areas of expertise are
required to complete additional training. All departments that we contacted
also have training sessions that are usually held once a month. In addition to
time spent training, volunteer ¯re¯ghters in the state of Vermont are provided
pagers that issue a company-speci¯c tone in the event of a call followed by radio
information from the dispatcher. Ideally, ¯re¯ghters are expected to respond to
a tone if they are nearby and able, but in practice there is little oversight and
each ¯re¯ghter decides on a call-by-call basis whether to respond. The number
of calls varies by department; the median number of calls in 2005 for our sample
was 79, or roughly a call every four and a half days.
In the summer of 2006 we conducted an experiment and a survey of 205
Vermont volunteer ¯re¯ghters from 39 departments by both visiting individual
stations and by attending the state ¯re¯ghter convention or \muster." We con-
tacted departments that had responded to our initial survey to ask if they had
and were willing to share \call records" for 2005 with the date, time, and nature
of each call as well with information on which of the ¯re¯ghters responded. Not
all departments keep or are willing to share such detailed records, but the chiefs
of six departments agreed to do so. We then visited these departments during
their monthly meetings and passed out ¯fteen-page experiment/survey booklets
for the ¯re¯ghters to complete, which yielded 143 ¯re¯ghter observations. We
also set up a booth at the annual state muster, which is attended by ¯re¯ght-
ers from throughout the state, and passed out our materials, yielding another
62 observations, although these cannot be paired with call records from any
department.
9So that we could study selection into the ¯re service, we also conducted
our protocol with non-¯re¯ghter Vermonters. We purchased a sample of 2000
addresses in the state that were drawn randomly on all criteria save gender.
Because ¯re¯ghters are predominantly male, we chose to oversample males in
the community survey. Community members were sent letters with a brief ex-
planation of the protocol accompanied by a booklet that was identical to that
distributed to the ¯re¯ghters with the exception of detailed questions related to
¯re¯ghting. In order to increase response rates, we also gave them the option
of responding online, although only 10 percent did so. Four hundred thirteen
community members responded to the full survey. Twelve of these community
members happened to be current volunteer ¯re¯ghters and were added to the
sample of ¯re¯ghters.5 Of the remaining 401 community members, 189 reported
no volunteer activity and form the control group to which we compare ¯re¯ght-
ers. The 212 community members who engaged in some other form of volunteer
activity were removed from the analysis presented here because it is not clear
whether they are an appropriate control group given that, while they are not
volunteering for the ¯re service, they are engaging in other volunteer activities.
Comparing the demographic composition of community respondents to weighted
Current Population Survey (CPS) data from December 2006, we see that our
sample of community members is similar to both the state of Vermont and to
the U.S. more generally. The mean age in the sample of community members,
which was restricted to adults aged 18 or older is 48, while the national and state
mean age of adults is 46. The mean weekly earnings of community members
in our sample is $758 versus $743 in the U.S. and $615 in Vermont. Finally,
while our sample of non-volunteer community members is 63 percent male, this
5For the twelve ¯re¯ghters who completed the community surveys, we are missing informa-
tion on the ¯re¯ghter-speci¯c questions that were not included in that version of the survey.
In our analysis, these twelve ¯re¯ghters are included in the probit models of selection into the
group of ¯re¯ghters. However, they are not included in the models of volunteer hours or call
response.
10re°ects the sample design rather than a large gender di®erential in response
rates.
Motivations for Volunteering
We gathered data on six behavioral motives for volunteering for the ¯re
service. In addition to the two motives that the model focuses on (altruism and
image), we asked survey questions about career concerns, using the ¯re service
to make or be with friends (or being an extrovert in general), one's attitude
towards risk, and volunteering to comply with religious beliefs. The details are
as follows.6
Our proxy for altruism comes from a ¯eld experiment based on the original
dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) and a version in which a context similar
to the decision to volunteer was emphasized (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). In
the original dictator game, subjects are asked to donate to a random partici-
pant selected by the experimenter. There has been some debate about how to
interpret the resulting donation. Donations may be motivated by altruism, but
may also re°ect an \experimenter e®ect" arising from the experimenter's ability
to observe the subjects' actions (Elizabeth Ho®man and Smith, 1994). We im-
plement a modi¯ed version of the dictator game based on Eckel and Grossman
(1996) in which the subjects' actions are more clearly linked to altruism. In
our version of the game, participants were ¯rst asked to pick among thirteen
charities or write in a charity of their choice. They were then asked to decide
how much of a $100 endowment to transfer to their chosen charity. Given the
large expected sample size, each participant was told that we would randomly
implement 10% of the allocation decisions after they were all collected, yielding
an expected payo® of $10 if all of the money was kept. After the collection phase
was ¯nished we wrote checks to the charities for the total amounts donated and,
6For the sake of length, we only highlight the design of our experiment and survey. A copy
of the survey booklet is available at either of the authors' websites.
11to preserve the anonymity of their responses, we sent unnamed VISA gift cards
for the residual shares of the $100 to the chosen decision-makers. Obviously,
we could not run the experiment double blind because we needed to send the
chosen decision-makers the money that they decided to keep and we needed to
match the experiment and survey data to the call records for the ¯re¯ghters.
That said, we tried to make the decision as anonymous as possible. In addition
to the unnamed gift cards, participants were always referred to by an anony-
mous alphanumeric code, they were explicitly told not to write their names
anywhere on the booklets and, during the ¯rehouse visits, participants returned
their completed booklets in a covered box near the back of the room away from
the experimenters.
By allowing the subjects to choose from among a long list of charities or
even to write one in, we greatly increase the chances that a given subject will
be able to donate to a recipient that they feel is deserving. Eckel and Grossman
(1996) show that when subjects are provided with this type of context, donations
increase, suggesting that the dictator game allocation is motivated by altruism.
Figure 2 presents a histogram of charitable allocations in the dictator game
for volunteer ¯re¯ghters, volunteer community members, and non-volunteer
community members. We use the amount allocated to charity as a proxy for
altruism in the analysis that follows.7 Volunteer ¯re¯ghters and volunteer com-
munity members have similar outcomes in the dictator game, and both groups
tend to donate more than the non-volunteer community members. The mean
donation for the ¯re¯ghters was $77.35, while that for volunteer community
members was $76.20, and the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant (t=.7399,
p-value=0.4598). The non-volunteers, by contrast, have a mean allocation of
$67.92, which is signi¯cantly di®erent from the allocation of either volunteer
7If we instead include an indicator for the respondent giving all of the money to charity,
the results in the next two sections are similar.
12group. (P-values for pairwise tests of mean allocations for the two volunteer
groups versus the non-volunteers are both less than 0.05.) The similarity be-
tween the distribution of allocations for the two volunteer groups (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test yields a p-value of 0.742, indicating no signi¯cant di®erence be-
tween the distributions) is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it supports the
decision to exclude the volunteer community members from the models of selec-
tion into volunteer ¯re¯ghting that follow. Second, the similarity in outcomes
also is consistent with the assumption that the slight change in protocol for
¯re¯ghters and community members (i.e., visiting the stations versus mailing
the booklets) did not have a noticeable e®ect on allocations.8
The second motivation for volunteering that we consider is concern for one's
image. As with altruism, an indirect and less obvious approach to measuring
image concerns seems more likely to yield an accurate measure. Instead of asking
directly whether a participant valued his or her reputation in the community,
we asked a question designed to determine whether he or she chose to display
information about him or herself to others. When people in the state of Vermont
register their automobiles they are randomly issued a license plate but can
chose to pay more to receive a \vanity plate," which has special lettering or
of the addition of a special placard. Examples of possible placards include
endangered animals on the \Conservation" plate, children's drawings on the
\Building Bright Futures" plate, the purple heart medallion issued to wounded
soldiers or the international symbol of the Freemasons. We asked whether our
8This assumption is further supported by two observations. First, the 12 volunteer ¯re-
¯ghters who were picked up in the community surveys have a mean dictator game allocation of
$77.29, which is quite similar to the mean of $78.33 observed for the ¯re¯ghters who were sur-
veyed in person. The distributions of their allocations are also similar, although the very small
sample of ¯re¯ghters from the mail survey precludes statistical inference. Second, although
our selection equations focus on a comparison of the volunteer ¯re¯ghters to the non-volunteer
community members, we note that we obtain similar estimates of the relationship between
the dictator game allocation and the propensity to volunteer when comparing volunteer com-
munity members and non-volunteer community members, who both completed the mailed
surveys.
13participants purchased such a vanity plate for their vehicles. There are a variety
of placards available to all Vermonters and we intend ownership of a vanity plate
to be a proxy for image concern for both community members and ¯re¯ghters.
However, most ¯re¯ghters select the placard shown in Figure 1. Displaying
the maltese cross on one's vehicle broadcasts to everyone that the driver is a
person that volunteers a lot of time to the community. It is also important to
note that the placard in Figure 1 does not help volunteers respond to tones
quickly because most volunteer ¯re¯ghters purchase warning lights and sirens
for their personal vehicles for this purpose. In other words, there are ways to be
modest about one's involvement (e.g., by installing dashboard-mounted rather
than roof-mounted °ashing red lights on a personal vehicle) but spending more
on the plate in Figure 1 is not one of them.
We also considered other, un-modeled, reasons why people might volunteer
for the ¯re service. It might be the case, for example, that people think that
volunteering will enhance their performance on the job or help them get a job
(Clary and Snyder, 1999). To asses this motive we asked about the degree to
which respondents agreed with three statements about the career impacts of
volunteering. People might also volunteer because they are extroverts and the
¯re service allows them a new opportunity to interact with other people. In
addition to two direct questions about making friends or having friends already
in the ¯re department, we asked participants to respond to ¯ve extroversion
statements borrowed from the NEO personality inventory (Costa and McCrae,
1992). Interior ¯re ¯ghting is not the only risky endeavor facing volunteers;
simpler tasks like ventilating a roof can become dangerous when certain cir-
cumstances are accounted for (e.g., height, pitch, roo¯ng material, weather). It
might, therefore, be reasonable to believe that risk seekers are more likely to
join. We included six statements from the Weber et al. (2002) risk assessment
scale to assess each individual's willingness to engage in behaviors that were
14risky to one's health (e.g., bungee jumping). The last factor that we thought
might motivate a person to volunteer for the ¯re service is his commitment to
religion. Because many religions preach service to one's community, we asked
participants to rate how religious they were and we asked them how often they
attended religious services.
In addition to the behavioral measures that we focus on, we collected an
extensive set of demographics and two factors that we either thought would be
particularly important in this situation or have been discussed before. Many ¯re
departments in Vermont are associated with long family traditions and many
people join because of family connections. Because of this we gathered informa-
tion on whether a respondent currently has or has had a family member in the
¯re service (family ff). Freeman (1997) found that one of the biggest indictors
of whether or not one volunteers is whether the person had been explicitly asked
to serve. We asked a similar question (invited).
Table 1 provides a description of the variables used in the analysis as well as
their means for volunteer ¯re¯ghters and non-volunteer community members.
For inventories in which participants responded to a number of statements (ca-
reer concerns, extroversion, attitudes towards risk), we summarize their mo-
tives via factor analysis. Looking at di®erences in means, we see that, relative
to non-volunteer community members, volunteer ¯re¯ghters score higher on all
behavioral measures that we expect to contribute to a proclivity for prosocial
behaviors. Fire¯ghters allocate more to charity in the dictator game, are more
likely to have a vanity plate, and score higher on inventories of career concerns in
volunteering, social concerns in volunteering, extroversion, and risk. Fire¯ghters
are also more likely to be religious, to have family members who are ¯re¯ghters,
and to have been invited to join the department. Moreover, all di®erences in
behavioral factors between ¯re¯ghters and non-volunteer community members
are signi¯cant with p-values below 0:01.
154 Estimates of volunteering
Table 2 presents the results of a probit analysis in which the dependent variable
indicates whether a respondent belongs to our sample of volunteer ¯re¯ghters or
non-volunteer community members. In Model 1 we provide estimates of the re-
lationship between the decision to volunteer and various potential motivations
(altruism, image concerns, career concerns, social concerns and extroversion,
risk attitudes, religiosity, family in the ¯re service, and an indicator for being
invited). We increase the number of variables in Model 2 to include demographic
controls for age, gender, marital status, children, educational attainment, stu-
dent status, employment status, income, wages, Vermont nativity, charitable
donations, and distance from residence and workplace to the local ¯re depart-
ment. Model 3 introduces instruments for altruism that are described in greater
detail in the following sub-section.
The e®ect of altruism in Model 1 is positive and indicates that an approx-
imate one standard deviation increase in the dictator game allocation ($30) is
associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of belonging to
the sample of volunteer ¯re¯ghters. In addition, respondents with vanity plates,
our proxy measure of image concerns, are 14 percentage points more likely to
be ¯re¯ghters. We ¯nd that a one unit increase on the 1{5 Likert scale question
\Volunteering is a good way to make friends" is associated with a 15 percent-
age point increase in the probability of volunteering. The point estimates also
suggest that extroversion is positively correlated with becoming a ¯re¯ghter,
but the coe±cient is not signi¯cant. Career concerns, a taste for risk, and reli-
gionsity are also positively associated with selection into ¯re¯ghting. Finally, as
expected, having family members who have been ¯re¯ghters and being invited
to join the local department have a strong positive relationship with ¯re¯ghting.
The coe±cient on our proxy for altruism in Model 2, which includes ad-
16ditional demographic controls, is identical to that in Model 1, but, because
the standard error increases slightly (perhaps due to the reduction in sample
size due to missing observations of added variables), it is no longer signi¯cant
(p = 0:155). The relationship between image, volunteering to make friends,
religion, having family members who are ¯re¯ghters, and being invited remain
quite similar. We see trends in some of the other measures of behavioral moti-
vations that suggests that they are not robust to the addition to demographic
controls; the coe±cient on career concerns has become negative and insigni¯cant
and the e®ect of having friends on the department now appears to be negative.
Unreported coe±cients for the demographic controls are, overall, as expected.
We estimate that younger individuals, men, and those without children at home
are more likely to volunteer, which is not surprising given that the ¯re service
has traditionally been male-dominated and that volunteer ¯re¯ghting can be
physically rigorous, time intensive, and unpredictable.
Potential Instruments
Observing correlations between self-reported attitudes or lab-based behavior
and volunteering provides evidence on how volunteers di®er from non-volunteers
and how work in the lab relates to real life. Researchers typically treat attitu-
dinal measures such as altruism as exogenous. This seems reasonable in labo-
ratory experiments of short duration, but outside of the lab repeated prosocial
behaviors may have feedback e®ects in which they, in turn, a®ect attitudes. In
the context of this paper, altruism may motivate volunteers, but volunteering
may also positively or negatively in°uence altruism. This possibility has not
been examined previously and there is little existing evidence on potentially
valid instruments. We include several questions aimed at providing possible in-
struments for altruism, which should relate to the formation of a respondent's
altruistic attitudes prior to selecting into ¯re¯ghting, but should not otherwise
17be related to that decision.
Previous evidence has demonstrated the inter-generational transmission of
generosity (Mark Wilhelm and Steinberg, 2008). After each respondent chooses
his allocation in the dictator game, we asked each how much he thought his
mother would have allocated in the same situation (mother allocation) with
the idea that parental altruism will have a®ected child altruism via some com-
bination of \nature" and \nurture."9 However, it is possible that respondents
would tend to simply attribute their decision in the experiment to any other
participant, yielding what psychologists would term \false consensus bias." To
control for this possibility, we also asked what the respondent thought a random
participant would donate (random participant allocation). Conditional on our
control for false consensus bias, we expect that mother's altruism will have in-
°uenced child's altruism, but that it will otherwise not directly be related to
the decision to volunteer.
In addition, we asked respondents if they had ever participated in the Boy
or Girl Scouts of America as children (scout). Both scouting organizations are
popular national movements that incorporate values related to altruism. The
Boy Scouts of America states that the organization's mission is to \prepare
young people to make ethical and moral choices over their lifetimes by instilling
in them the values of the Scout Oath and Law," which include the promise
to \help others at all times" and the statement that a scout is, among other
things, \helpful, friendly, courteous, and kind" (Boy Scouts of America, 2007).
The Girl Scouts, a separate organization, has a stated program goal that in-
cludes encouraging scouts to \relate to other with increasing understanding,
skill, and respect." Girl Scouts recite a promise \to help people at all times"
9Using measures of charitable giving from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Mark Wil-
helm and Steinberg (2008) ¯nd an intergenerational correlation in generosity. In a similar vein,
Dohmen et al. (2006) ¯nd that attitudes towards trust and risk are transmitted from parents
to children.
18(Girl Scouts of America, 2007). To the extent that children typically select
into these organization at a young age (Boy Scouting begins at age 11 and Girl
Scouting at age 7) and with the support of a parent, we anticipate that mem-
bership indicates exposure to teaching aimed to increase altruism but that this
is unlikely to be otherwise correlated with volunteering as an adult.
Column 3 of Table 2 reports the results of an instrumental variable probit
model of selecting into ¯re¯ghting using mother allocation, random participant
allocation, and scout to instrument for altruism. The marginal e®ect of the
dictator allocation when instrumented is highly signi¯cant and more than twice
as large as in the previous models; a one standard deviation in the allocation is
associated with a 15 percentage point increase in the probability of volunteering.
While the relationship between altruism and volunteering was also positive in
uninstrumented models, the instrumental variables results suggest that the e®ect
of altruism is of a more similar magnitude to that of reputation, a desire to make
friends, and religiosity. One possible explanation for this result is that there is
something about the act of volunteering itself that actually tends to decrease
altruism or the measurement of altruism via the dictator game.
We carried out a range of diagnostic tests to assess the validity of these
instruments. Looking at an (unreported) ¯rst stage regression of the dictator-
game allocation on mother allocation, random participant allocation, and
scout as well as the remaining exogenous variables from Model 2 for the de-
cision to volunteer, we see that the ¯rst two are individually signi¯cant while
the coe±cient on scouting has a p-value of 0.36. As expected, there is a positive
correlation between the dictator game allocation of a respondent the alloca-
tion s/he predicts his mother would make, even controlling for the possibility
of projecting one's level of altruism onto others. Respondents who were scouts
as children give an average of $3.17 more in the dictator game. The three
instruments are jointly signi¯cant with a p-value that is less than 0.001.
19A Wald test of exogeneity rejects the null with a p-value of 0.012, suggesting
the need to instrument for altruism. We also performed a Hausman test, but in
this case the rank of the di®erenced variance matrix did not equal the number
of coe±cients being tested and we were unable to rely on the test statistic.
However, a Hausman test for a simple model with only altruism in the right-
hand side indicates that the two models are statistically signi¯cantly di®erent.
Moreover, although we cannot assess statistical signi¯cance of the di®erence
between the overall models, the point estimates of the coe±cient on altruism
are more than twice as large when instrumented.
We performed a Amemiya-Lee-Newey test of overidenti¯cation and fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term in the selection equation. Hansen's J test also fails to reject the null when
using a linear probability instrumental variable model. Taken as a whole, the
results suggest that it may be necessary to endogenize altruism and we believe
that we have appropriate instruments for doing so.
However, even if this is not the case, we believe that the simple correlation
between altruism and volunteer behavior is a novel result of signi¯cant interest.
Establishing the external validity of an experiment like our dictator game may
have value for future research that attempts to bridge the existing lab experi-
mental literature and behaviors of traditional interest to economists (e.g., labor
supply, contract compliance...). The positive relationship between altruism and
volunteering remains even in uninstrumented models, indicating, at the very
least, that there is a positive relationship between altruism as measured by an
experiment and volunteering in real life.
We also note that, like altruism, other behavioral motivations may be en-
dogenous. The possible endogeneity of image concerns as proxied by having a
vanity plate is of special concern. Although we do not have potential instru-
ments for image, we argue that we can rule out two of the more obvious ways
20in which it might be endogenous via omitted variable bias or reverse causality.
First, because ¯re¯ghters, like all individuals, must register their vehicles and
select and pay for their plates themselves, it is not the case that vanity plates
can be given as a reward for service. Second, it does not appear to be the case
that the act of volunteering itself in°uences image concerns. If this type of re-
verse causality were present, we would expect the relationship between image
and volunteering to vary with years of experience as a volunteer. However, the
estimated coe±cient on image in the intensive labor supply models that follow is
robust to the addition of a control for experience, and if we interact experience
with image, the estimated coe±cient on the interaction is small and statistically
insigni¯cant.10
5 Estimates of turnout
The data include both a subjective and objective measure of the level of par-
ticipation in the volunteer ¯re service. First, we asked ¯re¯ghters to estimate
their average monthly hours spent on training and other ¯re-related \work."
Second, we obtained call records from six participating departments that listed
details of each call and which ¯re¯ghters responded. We are able to match 122
¯re¯ghters from our survey to these call records.
Using self-reported hours
Table 3 reports the results of separate log-hours regressions of ¯re¯ghter-estimated
training and call hours. Interestingly, altruism appears to be positively asso-
ciated with training hours but not with call hours while image is positively
10We choose not to include experience in the models of intensive labor supply because in
theory it might also be regarded as an outcome variable that is a®ected by behavioral moti-
vations. However, in practice, the results of interest are robust to the inclusion or exclusion
of this variable. One might also wish to interact altruism with experience to test for reverse
causality. However, altruism is not a statistically signi¯cant predictor of intensive volunteer
labor supply and, not surprisingly, the coe±cient on an interaction between altruism and
experience also is not statistically signi¯cant.
21associated with call hours but not with training. Responding to calls (in uni-
form on a large red truck with blaring sirens) is presumably far more visible than
training (which usually takes place inside the station or in the station parking
lots). The results, which are similar using instrumental variables techniques,
suggest that altruism plays a larger role in the less-visible venue while image
plays a larger role in the more-visible one. However, overall our models had little
explanatory power and most coe±cients were insigni¯cant. This may re°ect a
lack of variation in self-reported hours. The 25th and 75th percentiles of usual
monthly training hours were 4 and 11 hours. The 25th and 75th percentiles of
usual monthly call hours were 8 and 25 hours.
The lack of explanatory power may also result from errors in self-reporting.
Using the call records and call durations, we reconstruct individual ¯re¯ghters'
actual average monthly hours spent on call response and compare them to their
self-reported hours. We report the di®erence in actual and self-reported hours
in Figure 3. The average ¯re¯ghter self-reports spending nine more hours per
month on non-training work than we observe for him using call records and, as
the distribution shows, a large majority (91 percent) of ¯re¯ghters substantially
overestimate their hours. This is exactly the sort of self-reporting bias that
worries us about previous estimates of volunteer labor supply.
Given the likely error in self-reported hours, the positive relationship be-
tween image and call hours in Table 3 may re°ect a tendency of those with
image concerns to overstate their actual involvement in the ¯re service. To test
this, we regress each ¯re¯ghter's \error{ in self-reporting his hours on the vari-
ables listed in Table 3 as well as on image only. In neither case do we ¯nd a
signi¯cant relationship between reputation or other characteristics and the error
in reporting hours. The discrepancy between self-reported hours and call hours
may also result from ¯re¯ghters including non-call related ¯re work such as com-
munity outreach or equipment maintenance in their self-reports. If we use actual
22call hours rather than self-reported hours, the (unreported) results are similar
to those in Table 3, although the magnitude of the reputation e®ect is smaller
when using actual call hours. We conclude that although self-reported hours
are a problematic measure of volunteer labor supply, the relationship between
altruism and less-visible activities and reputation and more-visible activities is
robust.
Using an objective measure of call response
To our knowledge, previous studies of volunteerism all have relied on self-
reported volunteer hours, which in our case appear to be overestimated. To
provide a more objective measure, we use station call records for calendar year
2005. The data form an unbalanced panel in which each observation records
whether an individual ¯re¯ghter responded to a particular call.11 Because ¯re-
¯ghters don't know in advance how long any given call will take, response may
be a more accurate measure than total call hours. Tables 4 and 5 report the
results of several speci¯cations of a random e®ects call response model. Overall,
models using the objective measure appear to have greater explanatory power
than those using self-reported hours. As we found using self-reported call hours,
the e®ect of altruism is quite small and insigni¯cant across models and, not sur-
prisingly, tests of instrumental variable models do not suggest that we need to
instrument for it. We also choose to use a linear probability model rather than
a random e®ects probit model both to avoid potential instability in the use
of quadrature and to avoid di±culty in interpreting and calculating standard
errors for interaction terms (Ai and Norton, 2003). Fewer than 2 percent of
predictions fall outside of the [0;1] range and standard errors are corrected for
11Stations with more calls are over-represented in this panel. Controls are included for
station-speci¯c e®ects as well as for call volume and spacing. A separate balanced sample
was also created by randomly selecting calls for each ¯re¯ghter so that the number across
¯re¯ghters is the same. Results using the balanced sample are not substantially di®erent than
those presented here.
23heteroskedasticity induced by the linear model. Moreover, the marginal e®ects
presented in Tables 4 and 5 are quite robust to model speci¯cation; we get sim-
ilar estimates using random e®ects probits and instrumented probits as we do
with the random e®ects linear probability model that we present.
Table 4 presents three models of call response. In Model 1 we control only
for characteristics of the call, call history, and department ¯xed e®ects. We ¯nd
that ¯re¯ghters are less likely to respond to calls during typical work hours or
in the middle of the night. Call response is decreasing in the number of calls
in the past week, suggesting the presence of physical fatigue or of diminishing
marginal utility of responding to calls within a narrow window of time. As any
volunteer ¯re¯ghter could tell us, turnout is higher for calls for any sort of ¯re
as opposed to vehicle accidents, alarms, etc. In Model 2 we add measures of dif-
ferent explanations for prosocial behavior and in Model 3 we add demographic
controls as well. Altruism as measured by the dictator game allocation posi-
tively in°uences selection into the ¯re service, but does not have a signi¯cant
e®ect on call response conditional on selection. Image, however, continues to
be positively correlated with prosocial behavior; ¯re¯ghters with a vanity plate
are 12 percentage points more likely to respond to a call than those without.
Endogeneity, however, is a concern; it may be the case that ¯re¯ghters who are
more involved in their stations are more likely to purchase a vanity plate that
displays their status. Career is also positively associated with call response.
Interestingly factors such as a desire to make friends and religion that were pos-
itively associated with the decision to volunteer have negative (but insigni¯cant)
relationships to call response, suggesting that they may motivate selection into
volunteering but not the supply of volunteer hours.
In Table 5 we introduce controls for extrinsic incentives. There is substantial
variation across volunteer ¯re departments in Vermont in the presence and level
of small stipends paid to ¯re¯ghters. Many departments o®er no recompense
24for the ¯re¯ghters' time. However, others have a small pot of money that
is divided annually among the ¯re¯ghters. Others pay an hourly stipend for
time spent on calls. These payments are unlikely to exceed the direct costs of
participation in volunteer departments. Seventy percent of departments in our
initial survey o®er no compensation and, among those with an hourly wage for
calls, the mean is 8:34, far below the mean salaries of ¯re¯ghters who are often
leaving work to respond to calls. Moreover, training time is not compensated
by any departments and ¯re¯ghters are responsible for purchasing the lights
and sirens for their personal vehicles, which cost several hundred dollars. We
use two alternative measures of extrinsic incentives: the amount of any stipend
paid (Model 4) and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a stipend
(Model 5). Because the presence and level of stipends are colinear with the six
departments represented in the sample, we remove the department indicators
and replace them with a measure of annual call volume, which is likely an
important determinant of call response that was controlled for previously with
the station indicators.
We are particularly interested in whether the interaction between extrinsic
incentives and reputation is negative, as predicted by the model. Although we
are concerned that image and stipend could potentially be endogenous, the in-
teraction terms in Models 5 and 6 are less likely to be inconsistent. For this
to occur, we would need a story in which the interaction between image and
stipend is correlated with the error term once the direct e®ects of the two vari-
ables (and other observables) have been partialled out. It is quite di±cult to
come up with such a story. An example would be that plates are substitute for
stipends as rewards for volunteer service. In this case ¯re¯ghters with vanity
plates but no stipends would have greater volunteer labor supply than ¯re¯ght-
ers with vanity plates and stipends. However, we have already pointed out that
such a story is impossible because plates must be obtained and paid for by the
25individuals who will use them.
We ¯nd that the image concerns and the presence of a stipend are both
positively associated with turning out to a ¯re call. In Model 5, ¯re¯ghters with
a vanity plate are 28 percentage points more likely to respond to a call than
¯re¯ghters without one, and ¯re¯ghters who are paid an hourly stipend are 16
percentage points more likely to respond to a call than ¯re¯ghters who are not
paid a stipend. But the positive e®ect of a stipend is canceled for ¯re¯ghters
who have vanity plates; the e®ect of a stipend for those with image concerns is
e®ectively zero. Looking at Model 4, in which the level rather than the presence
of a stipend is used, we see essentially the same result. For a $1 increase in
the level of a stipend, ¯re¯ghters who do not have vanity plates are 2 percent
more likely to turn out to a call. The marginal e®ect of a stipend for ¯re¯ghters
who have vanity plates, however, is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The
negative coe±cients on the interactions terms indicate that for ¯re¯ghters with
image concerns the positive direct e®ect of small extrinsic incentives is canceled
by the negative indirect e®ect of incentives on their image for altruism.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced unique data on volunteer ¯re¯ghters and non-volunteer com-
munity members that combine survey measures of demographic and behavioral
attributes with a measure of altruism generated by the dictator game. The data
also include an objective measure of volunteer labor supply for the ¯re¯ghters
via departmental call records. Using these data, we are able to test the predic-
tions of a model in which prosocial behavior is determined by a combination of
altruism, image concerns, and extrinsic motivations.
We ¯nd that altruism as measured by the dictator game plays a role in
the real-life decision to volunteer, and that it also is positively correlated with
26¯re¯ghter training hours. However, altruism does not appear to in°uence a
¯re¯ghter's decision to respond to a call, suggesting that altruism is not an
important motivator in the level of provision of the more visible of the two
¯re¯ghting activities. Image concerns as proxied by having a vanity license
plate, on the other hand, are positively associated both with the decision to
volunteer and with call responses.
Recent research has focused on the potential impacts of o®ering extrinsic
incentives for prosocial behavior. We are able to o®er empirical evidence on
this by taking advantage of variation in the presence and level of small stipends
paid to volunteer ¯re¯ghters in Vermont. We ¯nd that o®ering such extrinsic
incentives to volunteers has the direct e®ect of increasing call response. How-
ever, this e®ect is negated for volunteers with image concerns; o®ering extrinsic
incentives to this group has zero net e®ect on their volunteer labor supply. This
result suggests that policy makers and volunteer organizations wishing to in°u-
ence prosocial behaviors should account for the complex interplay of extrinsic
incentives and image. Volunteers may value monetary rewards, but such rewards
can also have the indirect and presumably unanticipated e®ect of discouraging
prosocial behavior among those who care about being perceived as altruistic.
Turning to other factors, we ¯nd that social and career concerns, a desire to
make friends, religion, and being invited all play a positive role in the decision to
volunteer. However, they have a much smaller{ and possibly negative{ relation-
ship to the decision to turn out for a call. As with altruism, what motivates an
individual to become a volunteer does not necessarily carry through to greater
time devoted to volunteering.
27A Appendix:
Protocols for the behavioral variables
Altruism as measured by Dictator Game
Splitting $100
We begin the survey with a three-part decision-making task that involves real
money. In this task you will allocate $100 between yourself and a charity of
your choice. You will simply decide how much of the $100 you want us to send
directly to you and how much you want us to send to the charity. The funds for
this part of the survey have been provided by the National Science Foundation.
We expect that 500 people will respond to this survey. When we have collected
500 responses we will randomly pick 50 people and implement their decisions.
This means that you have a 1 in 10 chance of having your choice implemented.
In other words, for 1 in 10 people we will send you and/or the charity that you
select actual money. Therefore, you should consider your choices carefully.
The ¯rst thing that you will do is choose a charity. Then you will choose how
to allocate $100 between yourself and the charity that you picked. If you are one
of the 50 chosen participants, your choice will be implemented and you and/or
your charity of choice will receive the amounts of money that you have selected.
Part A:
Please choose the charity that you want to receive your donation.Pick one of the
following charities or write in a charity at the bottom:
o American Red Cross
o United Way
o Vermont Public Radio
o Amnesty International
28o American Cancer Society
o Doctors without Borders
o United Service Organizations (USO)
o UNICEF
o Vermont Land Trust
o Humane Society of the United States
o Habitat for Humanity
o The Nature Conservancy
o American Diabetes Association
o Other:
Part B:
Choose the amount of money that you want us to allocate to the charity of your
choice. The remaining money will be sent in the form of an anonymous VISA
gift card directly to you.
Allocate of the $100 to my charity of choice and send the rest to me.
Career Questions
For each of the following statements, please indicate how strongly you agree
using the scale provided below.
1:Strongly Disagree 2:Diagree 3:Neither 4:Agree 5:Strongly Agree
In general, it looks good to have volunteering on your resume.
Volunteering can help me to develop skills that will bene¯t me in my chosen
profession.
Volunteering can help me make contacts that are important to me professionally.
29Extroversion Questions
On the following pages there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please
use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes
you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the
future.
1:Very Inaccurate 2:Inaccurate 3:Neither 4:Accurate 5:Very Accu-
rate
Feel Comfortable around people.
Make friends easily.
Am skilled in handling social situations.
Don't like to draw attention to myself.
Talk to a lot of di®erent people at parties.
Risk Questions
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging
in each activity or behavior using the scale provided below.
1:Very Unlikely 2:Unlikely 3:Neither 4:Likely 5:Very Likely
Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed.
Going whitewater rafting during rapid water °ows in the spring.
Not wearing a seat belt when a passenger in the front seat.
Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky div-
ing).
Trying out bungee jumping at least once.
Piloting your own small plane, if you could.
30Religion Questions
Please rate your religious outlook.
o Religious
o Somewhat religious
o Not very religious
o Not religious
o Don't know






A complete version of the survey booklet is available at both authors' websites.
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35Table 1: Variable descriptions and means
volunteer community
variable description ¯re¯ghters members
Behavioral factors
altruism allocation to charity in dictator game ($0-$100) 77.35 67.92
image I(non-standard (\vanity") license plate) 0.23 0.11
career factor score for 3 questions about volunteering and ca-
reer concerns
0.26 -0.23
friends1 volunteering is a good way to make friends (scale 1-5) 4.60 4.10
friends2 I(friends on ¯re department prior to joining) 0.75 0.47
extroversion factor score for 5 extroversion questions 0.18 -0.21
risk factor score for 6 risk questions 0.32 -0.14
religious I(attends religious services and/or rates religious out-
look as at least somewhat religious)
0.66 0.52
family ® I(have family member who is a ¯re¯ghter) 0.59 0.24
invited I(have been invited to join local ¯re department) 0.67 0.12
Demographics and other factors
residence far I(home is >2 miles from ¯re station) 0.35 0.40
work far I(work is >2 miles from ¯re station) 0.51 0.25
age age in years 38.61 47.99
male I(male) 0.93 0.63
student I(student) 0.08 0.04
married I(married) 0.61 0.59
children <=12 I(young children at home) 0.39 0.64
children 13{18 I(older children at home) 0.26 0.53
<hs education I(education < high school degree 0.08 0.05
hs education I(high school degree) 0.35 0.25
> hs education I(education beyond high school) 0.57 0.70
VT native I(born in Vermont) 0.64 0.46
employed I(currently employed) 0.92 0.76
income <15k I(annual household income <15,000) 0.07 0.09
income 15-35k I(annual household income 15-35,000) 0.16 0.20
income 35-50k I(annual household income 35-50,000) 0.17 0.17
income 50-75k I(annual household income 50-75,000) 0.24 0.22
income 75-100k I(annual household income 75-100,000) 0.16 0.16
income >100k I(annual household income >100,000) 0.20 0.16
wage (if employed) hourly wage or, for salaried workers, imputed wage 17.42 22.92
donation amount of household's charitable donations in past year 469.18 799.39
Fire¯ghter-speci¯c variables
presence of stipend I(¯re department pays hourly stipend for calls) 0.67 .
amount of stipend amount of hourly stipend or, for departments that o®er
lump sum incentives, imputed hourly stipend
5.34
call hours Usual monthly training hours 10.28
training hours Usual monthly call hours 18.94
n 217 189
36Table 2: Probit models of selection into volunteer ¯re¯ghting
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e.
altruism (DG allocation) 0.0017* 0.0010 0.0017 0.0012 0.0052*** 0.0019
image (vanity plate) 0.1416* 0.0797 0.2308** 0.0942 0.2429*** 0.0928
career (factor score) 0.0706* 0.0428 -0.0021 0.0564 0.0016 0.0567
friends1 (make friends) 0.1533** 0.0617 0.2379*** 0.0733 0.2157*** 0.0717
friends2 (friends on dept) 0.0253 0.0732 -0.0787 0.0820 -0.0653 0.0805
extroversion (factor score) 0.0405 0.0381 0.0641 0.0448 0.0459 0.0431
risk (factor score) 0.1121*** 0.0356 0.0487 0.0503 0.0313 0.0484
religious 0.1087* 0.0650 0.1495* 0.0821 0.1566** 0.0782
family ® 0.2561*** 0.0618 0.2897*** 0.0729 0.2783*** 0.0713
invited 0.5108*** 0.0523 0.4598*** 0.0741 0.4286*** 0.0799
demographic controls no yes yes
instrumental variables no no yes
n 386 320 314
Demographic controls include age, gender, student status, marital status, children under age 12, children
aged 12{18, education level, employment status, income, wage, Vermont native, annual charitable donations,
and distance from residence and place of work to ¯re station. Instruments for altruism in Models 3 are
mother allocation, random participant allocation, and scout. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
Table 3: Regressions for log training and call hours
Call Hours Training Hours
coef s.e. coef s.e.
altruism (DG allocation) -0.0016 0.0038 0.0111** 0.0052
image (vanity plate) 0.4016* 0.2333 0.0748 0.2926
career (factor score) -0.2189 0.1428 -0.0921 0.1960
friends1 (make friends) 0.0764 0.1658 -0.0458 0.2145
friends2 (friends on dept) 0.2128 0.2560 -0.0781 0.3104
extroversion (factor score) -0.0214 0.1420 0.1245 0.1720
risk (factor score) 0.1223 0.1099 -0.0644 0.1492
religious -0.1561 0.3194 -0.3659 0.3659
family ® 0.0160 0.1777 -0.0392 0.2217
invited 0.3208 0.3610 0.3233 0.3547
demographic controls yes yes
instrumental variables no no
n 146 148
Top 1 percent of hours are dropped from analysis as large outliers. Demo-
graphic controls include age, gender, student status, marital status, children
under age 12, children aged 12{18, education level, employment status, in-
come, wage, Vermont native, annual charitable donations, years of experience,
distance from residence and place of work to ¯re station, and ¯xed e®ects for
large stations. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
37Table 4: Random e®ects linear probability models of call response
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e.
Call characteristics
spring 0.0143* 0.0081 0.0118 0.0083 0.0073 0.0100
summer 0.0184** 0.0076 0.0175** 0.0078 0.0108 0.0093
fall 0.0164** 0.0076 0.0169** 0.0078 0.0020 0.0093
weekend 0.0847*** 0.0067 0.0843*** 0.0069 0.1033*** 0.0083
typical work hours (8-5) -0.0874*** 0.0061 -0.0945*** 0.0063 -0.1042*** 0.0076
late night (11-5) -0.0356*** 0.0100 -0.0313*** 0.0103 -0.0238* 0.0124
¯re call 0.0832*** 0.0081 0.0806*** 0.0083 0.0962*** 0.0100
calls in last week -0.0016** 0.0008 -0.0018** 0.0009 -0.0021** 0.0010
Fire¯ghter characteristics
altruism (DG allocation) -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0009
image (vanity plate) 0.1237*** 0.0479 0.1296*** 0.0502
career (factor score) 0.0496* 0.0284 0.0993*** 0.0347
friends1 (make friends) -0.0286 0.0345 -0.0442 0.0406
friends2 (friends on dept) -0.0320 0.0487 -0.0513 0.0497
extroversion (factor score) -0.0158 0.0228 -0.0192 0.0214
risk (factor score) -0.0194 0.0206 -0.0070 0.0259
religious -0.0466 0.0483 -0.0497 0.0551
family ® 0.0565 0.0398 0.0340 0.0418
invited 0.0784* 0.0433 0.0300 0.0555
department indicators yes yes yes
demographic controls no no yes
n 22775 21808 15099
Random e®ects linear probability model of call response. Standard errors are robust. Demographic controls
include age, gender, student status, marital status, children under age 12, children aged 12{18, education
level, employment status, income, wage, Vermont native, annual charitable donations, and distance from
residence and place of work to ¯re station. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
38Table 5: Random e®ects linear probability models of call response with
interaction terms
Model 4 Model 5
m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e.
Call characteristics
spring 0.0073 0.0100 0.0071 0.0100
summer 0.0107 0.0093 0.0107 0.0093
fall 0.0020 0.0094 0.0021 0.0094
weekend 0.1033*** 0.0083 0.1033*** 0.0083
typical work hours (8-5) -0.1043*** 0.0076 -0.1043*** 0.0076
late night (11-5) -0.0240* 0.0124 -0.0239* 0.0124
¯re call 0.0960*** 0.0100 0.0959*** 0.0100
calls in last week -0.0021** 0.0010 -0.0021** 0.0010
calls in 2005 -0.0004*** 0.0002 -0.0005*** 0.0002
Fire¯ghter characteristics
altruism (DG allocation) 0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 0.0009
image (vanity plate) 0.2684*** 0.0923 0.2775*** 0.0903
career (factor score) 0.1123*** 0.0334 0.1064*** 0.0325
friends1 (make friends) -0.0331 0.0375 -0.0287 0.0373
friends2 (friends on dept) -0.0577 0.0490 -0.0542 0.0481
extroversion (factor score) -0.0199 0.0205 -0.0213 0.0202
risk (factor score) 0.0002 0.0241 0.0030 0.0235
religious -0.0626 0.0503 -0.0618 0.0492
family ® 0.0511 0.0396 0.0468 0.0396
invited 0.0203 0.0535 0.0128 0.0525
Stipend/Reputation interactions
amount of stipend 0.0197*** 0.0071
amount of stipend*vanity plate -0.0207* 0.0121
presence of stipend 0.1558*** 0.0570
presence of stipend*vanity plate -0.1959* 0.1030
department indicators no no
demographic controls yes yes
n 15099 15099
Random e®ects linear probability model of call response. Standard errors are robust.
Demographic controls include age, gender, student status, marital status, children under
age 12, children aged 12{18, education level, employment status, income, wage, Vermont
native, annual charitable donations, and distance from residence and place of work to
¯re station. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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